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W hereas government or international public institutions
once performed most agricultural research, now private 
firms are taking the lead in applying the tools of genetic
engineering to agriculture. When corporations (and increas-
ingly public agencies too) develop new agricultural biotech-
nology products or processes or new crop varieties, they
often seek legal rights over the intellectual property these
innovations represent. Many are concerned that corpora-
tions’ efforts to protect their profits will isolate developing
countries from the benefits of important innovations by
blocking access to new developments by public and
nonprofit researchers.
Corporations concentrate their research efforts on crops such
as hybrid corn, soybean, canola, cotton, and some specialty
horticultural products, which are grown for markets with high
commercial value. The range of crops and production prob-
lems addressed by private research could well expand, but,
as in the health area, private investment is mostly a comple-
ment, not a substitute, for continued public and other
nonprofit research.  Moreover, the development of a vast
number of crops critical to food security throughout the 
developing world (such as cassava, yams, sweet potatoes,
sorghum, millet), as well as crops that are globally grown 
(like rice, wheat, and maize), must continue to rely on public
and nonprofit institutions as the principal source of genetic
innovation. In developed economies, these types of institu-
tions may increasingly find their access to essential new
research inputs uncertain, unduly expensive, or even blocked
altogether. This lack of access to intellectual property in the 
developed countries is a source of aggravation and ineffi-
ciency but is not currently a serious threat to the well-being
of their citizens.
For the poor in less-developed countries, access to new
biotechnology might be much more crucial. They rely for
sustenance on crops that are largely beyond the focus 
of the private research sector, and that have modest future
commercial prospects. In addition, poor producers often
face production problems different from those of commer-
cial farmers in wealthier countries. Recent well-publicized
“donations” of “intellectual property” by major multinational
corporations to developing countries for certain non-
commercial crops, while dramatizing the potential useful-
ness of biotechnology, have reinforced the impression that
these countries lack access to modern technologies.
A closer look at the legal and economic realities facing agri-
cultural researchers in developing countries reveals that these
concerns are valid over the longer term but highly exagger-
ated as an immediate threat, thereby diverting attention
away from more important problems.  
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FOR MORE THAN a century, plant breeders in government-funded research centers have sought out
crop varieties with characteristics that might help poor farmers in developing countries grow more
food. They have painstakingly bred and cross-bred these varieties through generations to achieve a
desirable mix of characteristics. At an accelerating pace in the 1960s and 1970s the work of these
breeders changed the developing world—the higher-yielding varieties of wheat, rice, and other food
staples they produced helped avert catastrophic famine in Asia—and their work continues to improve
the lives and livelihoods of millions of people. Now, however, critics of the newest tool in the agricul-
tural researchers’ toolbox—genetic engineering—argue that the new environment for agricultural
research may leave farmers in the developing countries out in the cold. 
Agricultural researchers in many devel-
oping countries are freer than one might
think to make use of innovations
protected in the developed countries.THE RIGHTS TO RESEARCH
The principal public policy rationale for intellectual property
rights (IPRs) is that they provide direct socially beneficial
incentives to innovate as well as facilitate further innovation
by mandating public disclosure of the patented technology.
When individuals or organizations know that legal protec-
tion will enable them to recoup their research investments,
they have a stronger incentive to pursue such innovations.
Countries with strong traditions of innovation have long
histories of IPRs—the United Kingdom awarded its first
patent in 1449, and the authority for the U.S. patent system
is enshrined in that country’s Constitution ratified in 1788. 
In the absence of protection, disclosed new ideas and infor-
mation are entirely in the public domain, and an innovator’s
attempts to recoup investment or to profit commercially
from an innovation may fail because of imitation. Knowing
this, prospective inventors may underinvest in R&D, or
inventors may exploit their inventions in secret. In addition,
by clarifying rights to new ideas, intellectual property rights
help reduce the costs that would otherwise be required to
determine ownership of rights. 
An important, but perhaps under-appreciated aspect of most
systems of intellectual property rights is their requirement
that the inventors and researchers seeking these rights must
disclose the new knowledge they have obtained. As new
ideas are disseminated through publication, licensing, or
other means, this information stimulates further rounds of
innovation and technological advances.
Inherent in intellectual protection is a tension between the
goal of providing incentives for innovation and the goal 
of allowing innovators to build upon one another’s work.
The broader the monopoly rights conferred, the larger the
potential threat to the freedom to operate—the ability to
practice or use an innovation. Owners of a technology may
be unwilling to share or license it or willing only after costly
negotiations, thus making it difficult for others to obtain
essential tools for advancing their own research. Moreover,
owners of technology may litigate against alleged
infringers, so in practice, those who hope to use a
protected technology must weigh the risk of litigation
against the costs of obtaining licenses.
To further complicate matters, the modern methods used 
to develop new crop varieties depend on a wide range 
of component innovations, the rights to which might be
held by many competing parties—be they patent rights 
or assigned use rights via commercial contracts or licenses.
And the number of separate rights needed to produce a
new innovation will only escalate as biotechnology patents
become more prevalent. If ownership of these rights is
diffuse and uncertain, it can be difficult or impossible for
potential users to successfully negotiate with all of the
relevant parties.  
Yet agricultural researchers in many developing countries
are freer than one might think to make use of innovations
protected in the developed countries. This is because there
is no such thing as an “international patent right.” A patent
or other intellectual property right awarded in, for example,
the United States does not a priori confer property rights in
the rest of the world. Patents and other intellectual prop-
erty rights are awarded by national governments, and the
protection conferred extends only as far as the geographic
boundaries of the country in which the right is awarded.
Thus, to obtain patent protection in several countries, inno-
vators must apply for and gain rights in each. Anyone isfree to make, use, or sell whatever technology or
knowledge is available for crops in countries where that
technology is not subject to intellectual property protec-
tion, irrespective of whether the crop is grown for
subsistence or commercial use or whether the tech-
nology is protected elsewhere. 
The extent of freedom to operate in less-developed
countries is not well understood. For example, the
recent vitamin A rice innovation (“golden rice”)
reportedly requires permission to practice over 70
patent rights. The well-publicized donations by
major corporations of their intellectual property rele-
vant to vitamin A rice left a strong impression that the
exercise of large numbers of crucial patent rights was
being relinquished in favor of the poor in developing coun-
tries. In fact, in some major rice-consuming countries, there
are no valid relevant patents, and in most, there are very
few. Similarly, the well-publicized donations of virus-
resistant technology for some noncommercial potato vari-
eties in Mexico and for sweet potato in Africa apparently
do not involve any patents relevant in the target countries.
Finally, a survey reported fairly widespread use of protected
intellectual property by the centers of the Consultative
Group on International Agricultural Research, in many cases
without formal authorization from the patentees. But no
distinction was drawn between patents valid in developed
countries and those valid in the centers’ host countries.
Though there is no international patent, international treaties
and organizations do play an important role in intellectual
property rights: they make it easier to extend protection to
multiple countries and provide a uniform, minimal set of laws
and standards that apply to all subscribing countries.
Increasingly, innovators in developing countries are seeking
intellectual property rights in developed countries, and vice
versa. Currently, however, in the fields of agriculture and
agricultural biotechnology, the type and scope of protection
varies greatly from country to country, especially between
developed and developing countries. This variation makes it
more difficult to assess whether there is freedom to operate
on an international level. 
HOW PRODUCTION AND TRADE PATTERNS 
AFFECT INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
Crop breeders in the developing world are free to produce
crops as long as the inputs and processes used and the
crop varieties grown are not protected under local intellec-
tual property laws. But those crops cannot be legally
exported to countries where they fall under intellectual
property protection. In such cases the importer, not the
breeder, may be infringing on intellectual property rights.
A recent IFPRI study looked at production and trade data
for 15 of the crops most important to research agencies
operating in developing economies: rice, wheat, maize,
soybeans, cassava, coconut, groundnuts, bananas, beans,
potatoes, sorghum, lentils, millet, barley, and chickpeas. 
As a group, the developing countries accounted for an
average of more than 65 percent of the world’s production
of sorghum, beans, and lentils during 1994–98. For the rest
of the 15 crops, they accounted for more than 90 percent
of world production (and for quite a few of these crops,
more than 98 percent). 
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traded across international borders. Of the 15 crops,
soybeans, coconuts, bananas, lentils, and beans are the only
ones for which more than 10 percent of developing-country
production is exported. Just two crops (soybeans and
bananas) account for 64 percent by value of developing-
country crop exports to the developed countries, and just
four countries (Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, and Ecuador)
account for 42 percent of such trade in these two crops.
When exports of rice to developed countries (mostly from
Thailand) and coconuts (mostly from the Philippines) are
added into the soybean and banana exports, these four
crops account for 80 percent of the total exports from devel-
oping to developed countries. Of these four crops, only rice
and coconuts are staples in the exporting countries. (The
traded bananas are dessert bananas; the staple cooking
bananas are almost entirely consumed domestically.)
Freedom to operate depends upon specific circum-
stances. An investigation of the intellectual property
rights assigned to the key enabling technologies used to
transform crops revealed that these rights are mainly held
in, and are therefore primarily relevant to, rich-country
jurisdictions. Thus, for most of the crops that matter for
food security in poor countries, researchers’ freedom to
operate is not impeded—much of the needed technology
is unencumbered by intellectual property rights in devel-
oping countries and little of the developing-country produc-
tion gets shipped into developed-country jurisdictions where
intellectual property rights may prevail. This does not mean,
however, that freedom to operate is not a problem for
developing-country research on export-oriented cash crops
such as horticultural products, tropical beverages like coffee
or cocoa, or dessert bananas.
FOCUSING ON THE REAL PROBLEMS
The largely misplaced concerns that patents and other forms
of intellectual property are currently severely constraining the
freedom to operate in developing countries is diverting atten-
tion from more crucial issues for agricultural researchers
working on staple food crops.
During the 1990s, growth in investment in agricultural
research in and for developing countries stalled. For some
regions like Africa it even began to shrink. Furthermore,
many developing countries lack the scientific skills to
effectively access the rapidly advancing stock of complex
modern biotechnologies, whether they are protected by
patents or not. As a matter of fact, most are not protected
in these developing countries. Failure to invest in devel-
oping the domestic expertise needed to evaluate, access,
and regulate the new technologies is currently a far greater
constraint than freedom to operate.
Moving forward in the 21st Century, the intellectual prop-
erty landscape will be altered by the Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property (TRIPs) agreement, which intro-
duced minimum standards for intellectual property rights
for new technologies by which all members of the World
Trade Organization must abide. As developing countries
come into compliance with the intellectual property rights
provisions of the TRIPs agreement, the implementations of
those provisions—both domestically and in export markets—
will affect researchers’ freedom to operate in future tech-
nologies of research and development. TRIPs requires
that member states allow patents for inventions but with
certain exceptions. The precise nature of these exceptions
has yet to be resolved. Members are not required to allow
plants to be patented, but they are required to protect
plant varieties, either through patents or through a sui
generis system (such as plant-breeder rights), or through
a combination of both systems.
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Failure to invest in developing the
domestic expertise needed to evaluate,
access, and regulate the new technolo-
gies is currently a far greater constraint
than freedom to operate.The misconception that intellectual property rights currently
impair freedom to operate of developing-country breeders
of food staple plants also threatens these countries’ effec-
tiveness in bargaining for access to the scientific outputs of
private corporations. By the mid-1990s, just over one-half
of the estimated US$21 billion (1993 prices) of agricultural
R&D in rich countries was done by private firms. Much of
the know-how and many of the constructs used to improve
crop varieties now reside in these corporations. Institutional
arrangements to facilitate effective partnerships between
the public and private sectors in agricultural R&D are just
beginning to emerge. These arrangements could help
enable the sharing of expertise along with the products and
processes to do the breeding and, perhaps, help direct
some private research toward poor peoples’ crops. Many
of these public-private arrangements involve institutions in
rich countries and are still largely unresolved regarding
research directed toward the poorer parts of agriculture in
developing countries. Bridging this private-public divide can
have profound long-term development consequences, but
it behooves all parties to have a proper perception of their
present degrees of freedom in order to effectively tap intel-
lectual property on behalf of the world’s poor.
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erty at the Center for the Application of Molecular
Biology to International Agriculture, Canberra, Australia.Intellectual property refers to products of the mind.
Inventions, computer programs, publications, video-
tapes, and music are all examples of intellectual prop-
erty. Intellectual property rights afford a time-limited
legal protection to artistic, scientific, technological, or
economic products. Copyrights, trademarks, design
patents, utility patents, plant patents, plant breeders’
rights, and trade secret laws are some of the ways of
protecting intellectual property rights. The type of intel-
lecual property to be protected and the legal and
administrative system of the country where the right 
is being sought affect the extent of rights, such as the
scope of the protection and the geographical limits to
and duration of the rights. 
In plant breeding, patents and plant breeders’ rights
have generally been the most important forms of intel-
lectual property protection. As the biotechnological
revolution unfolds, however, copyrights are becoming
more important because the databases that hold infor-
mation about plant genes can often be copyrighted.
Such copyrights do not, however, affect trade in prod-
ucts developed using the protected information. U.S.
state trade secret laws have been used to protect in-
house breeding materials such as the inbred lines of
maize used as parents of hybrids, but these laws do not
protect against independent discovery or reverse engi-
neering of products by their purchasers. Hence, patents
afford stronger protection than trade secret law for inno-
vation embodied in products. Trademarks are used for
the protection of  brand names of biotechnologies, such
as Monsanto’s Roundup Ready™ technology or Aventis’s
Liberty® and LibertyLink® technologies. Trademarks only
protect the names and other symbols denoting products
or technologies, not the technologies themselves.
Patents
The patent right is generally considered the most
powerful tool in the intellectual property system,
enabling the patent holder to exclude all others from
making, using, selling, or offering to sell the invention
in the country that granted the patent right or importing
it into that country, if it is made elsewhere, for as long
as the patent remains valid. To be patentable, an inven-
tion must satisfy  the criteria of novelty, nonobvious-
ness, and utility or industrial application. In addition, 
an inventor is required to describe the invention to the
public in a manner sufficiently clear and complete for
the invention to be reproduced by another person
skilled in the art. 
A PRIMER A Primer on Intellectual Property Rights and Agricultural BiotechnologyWhile many member countries of the World Trade
Organization are still in the process of implementing a
protection system for plants, the United States and
Europe have led the way in allowing utility patents for
plants, particularly for transgenic plants. In 1985, the
U.S. Patent Office Board of Appeals ruled that asexually
and sexually propagated seeds, plants, and tissue
culture could be protected by utility patents. More
recently, the European Patent Office has held that trans-
genic methods and plants are not per se unpatentable.
Plant Breeders’ Rights 
Plant breeders’ rights (PBRs), or plant variety protec-
tion, are a form of intellectual property protection for
plants offered in most developed countries and a
growing number of developing countries. While coun-
tries differ in how they implement PBRs, the laws
usually grant protection to varieties that are novel,
distinct, uniform, and stable. Thus, the variety must not
have been previously sold, be clearly distinguishable
from previous varieties, be uniform, and breed true to
type. The holder of a plant breeder’s right has a legal
monopoly over commercialization of that variety for a
prescribed length of time, allowing the recovery of the
cost of breeding commercially valuable new plant vari-
eties. Although the details of protection vary from
country to country, in general, the sale, reproduction,
import, and export of new varieties of plants are
encompassed. Exceptions may be made, however, for
research, breeding of new varieties, and use of seed
saved by a farmer for replanting. Moreover, in some
countries, if a protected variety is used as the basis for a
transgenic plant, the latter is covered by the plant
breeder’s right if it constitutes a variety “essentially
derived” from the protected variety.
Contractual and
Technological Proprietary Tools
In addition to the legal protection
afforded by patents and plant breeders’
rights, contractual provisions may be used to
extend or establish intellectual property rights.
Such contracts include 
• material transfer agreements between technology
developers and third parties, which limit the transfer
and use of materials such as vectors, genes, and
plants developed by the transferor; 
• bag label contracts between the manufacturer and the
buyer of seed, for example, which limit further uses of
purchased material that would otherwise be allowable; 
• technology use agreements between technology
suppliers and farmers, which typically control the right
to plant a given seed on a specific area of land for a
certain period of time; and 
• licenses between patent or property holder and
licensee, which are negotiated grants of some or all of
the holder’s rights, such as allowing the use and sale
of the technology.
There are also a number of genetic technologies that
impose technical limits on farmers’ use of seeds from
their harvest to replant or to sell for replanting. The
most common is production of hybrid crops that gener-
ally have a lower yield through loss of “hybrid vigor”
if replanted. Modern alternatives include genetic use
restriction technologies that confer sterility on replanted
seeds—popularly dubbed terminator technologies—and
others that allow reproduction but prevent expression
of proprietary traits until the plant is treated with a
specific chemical activator.
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